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DEBORAH GOLDBERG*
Increasingly expensive state judicial elections and visibly growing special
interest involvement erode public confidence in the impartiality of our courts.
This article contends that new legislation establishing public financing of
judicial campaigns and full disclosure of interest group spending is the most
effective way to address the impact of big money on campaigns for judicial seats.
This solution is analyzed for both contested and retention elections. The
discussion presents the three most common approaches for breaking the
dependency of judicial candidates on monied interests and recommends full
public financing as the best way to address threats to fairness and impartiality
caused by private contributions to candidates in competitive judicial elections.
The author also discusses constitutional issues presented by key elements of that
system and related campaign finance measures, concluding that an ideal
program will survive challenge only iffederal courts recognize and affirm the
crucial differences between judges and other elected officials.
I. INTRODUCTION
"Is justice for sale?" That is the question increasingly raised in states that hold
elections for judges.' The concern arises in response to a rapid escalation of
* Acting Director, Democracy Program, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of
Law.
I See, e.g., Beverly P. Kraft, Candidates: Judicial Race Costly, JACKSON CLARION-
LEDGER, Sept. 6, 2000 (quoting Mississippi Judge Keith Starrett as saying that the rising cost
"puts the judiciary in a position of being for sale"); Doug Oplinger, Supreme Court Race to
Alter Ohio Politics, AKRON BEACON J., Nov. 3, 2000, at www.ohio.com/bj/news/docs/
016169.htm (quoting Ohio State University Law Professor Louis Jacobs' view that the "net
effect is bound to create the image of justice for sale"). The question is also raised by interest
groups casting aspersions on the integrity of judges they seek to unseat. In a now infamous ad
attacking Ohio Supreme Court Justice Alice Resnick, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce depicted
Lady Justice lifting her blindfold to watch as a rising pile of money tilted her scales. The ad
opened and closed with the query: "Is justice for sale?" A storyboard (with video of the
commercial at four-second intervals and the complete audio text) is reprinted in DEBORAH
GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS: How 2000 WAS A WATERSHED
YEAR FOR BIG MONEY, SPECIAL INTEREST PRESSURE, AND TV ADVERTISING IN STATE SUPREME
COURT CAMPAIGNS 21 (2002), available at http://www.faircourts.org/files/
JASMoneyReport.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2002).
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campaign fundraising and spending,2 and an equally precipitous decline in
civility, 3 in campaigns for seats on state supreme courts. These trends have not
yet infected every state, but there is good reason to expect their rapid spread.4 To
combat their ill effects-especially their tendency to impugn fair and impartial
courts-this article urges states to consider full public funding of judicial
elections and related campaign finance reforms.
II. CONTEMPORARY TRENDS IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
The influence of money on judicial elections cannot be denied. As one
commentator has put it:
As judicial races have become more competitive, campaign costs have risen
dramatically. Judicial candidates need the substantial resources offered by
interest groups to win.... The result can be an unhealthy dependence between
judicial candidates and interest groups where interest groups back judicial
candidates to secure their political agendas and candidates rely on interest group
backing to achieve and to retain judicial office.5
Total fundraising among candidates for state supreme courts jumped 61%
between 1998 and 2000, and average funds raised in that period grew by 25%.6 In
2 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 4-16; Roy A. Schotland, Financing Judicial
Elections, 2000. Change and Challenge, 2001 L. REV. MICH. ST. U.-DETROIT C.L. 849, 850-
52, 861-79.
3 See Joe Hallett, Supreme Court Race Features Outsider Mud, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
June 11, 2000, at 3B (describing the campaigns as "covered in muck"); Richard Henderson,
Op. Ed., The Price Tag Needs to Be Pulled from Texas Justice, STAR-TELEGRAM (Texas), May
6, 2000 (characterizing judicial elections as "expensive, sleazy, mudslinging alley fights"),
available at www.star-telegram.com/news/doc/1 047/1 :VIEWPOINTS5/1:
VIEWPOINT505061 00.html.
4 Some states conducting elections for their highest courts have so far escaped the
skyrocketing spending and the uncivil campaign tactics. In fact, "25% of state Supreme Court
candidates reported raising no money in 2000." GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 13.
Television advertising by political parties and interest groups, which are more likely than
candidates to use attack ads, was confined in that year's high court races to four states-
Alabama, Mississippi, Michigan, and Ohio. See id. at 15, 17. The negative tone of third-party
advertising in judicial elections follows trends observable in federal elections. See CRAIG B.
HOLMAN & LUKE MCLOUGHLIN, BUYING TIME 2000: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 2000
FEDERAL ELECTIONS 33-34 (2001), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/
buyingtime2000.html.
5 Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
1391, 1392-93 (2001).
6 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 4, 7-8; Schotland, supra note 2, at 850. Pressures
to increase fundraising arise from a variety of sources, including increased competition,
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addition, spending in the 2000 high court elections by political parties and interest
groups has been estimated at approximately $16 million in just the four states
with the most hotly contested races.7 More than $10 million of that sum
purchased television airtime alone.8 But we are still in the dark as to precisely
how much was spent and precisely who funneled all of the money into judicial
elections because interest groups have exploited campaign finance loopholes to
avoid disclosure of that information. 9 What we do know is that much of the
money going to candidates comes from lawyers and businesses. 10
Unquestionably, those contributions are undermining public confidence in fair
and impartial courts. 11
Interest group involvement is also plainly changing the character of
campaigns. In the 2000 supreme court elections, interest groups used attack ads
about 80% of the time; less than 20% of candidate ads were negative in tone.12
The most infamous ads, which verged on defamatory accusations that sitting
justices were in the pocket of special interests, were sponsored by independent
heightened politicization of judicial elections, professionalization of campaigns, and the
growing use of expensive media. See generally Kathryn Abrams, Some Realism About
Electoralism: Rethinking Judicial Campaign Finance, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 505, 515-16 (1999).
7 See Schotland, supra note 2, at 862-63.
8 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.
9 See id. at 18-19; Deborah Goldberg & Mark Kozlowski, Constitutional Issues in
Disclosure of Interest Group Activities, 35 IND. L. REV. 755, 757 (2002); MARK KOZLOWSKI,
REGULATING INTEREST GROUP ACTIVrrY IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 1-4 (2002), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/resources/resourcesjiseries.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2003).
10 See NEW POLITICS, supra note 1, at 9 (reporting that nearly half of the 1989-2000
contributions to supreme court candidates in eleven states came from lawyers and business); see
also Abrams, supra note 6, at 516.
11 Poll after poll demonstrates the public's belief that money contributed to candidates for
the bench affects judicial decision-making. For the most recent nationwide polls of American
voters and state judges, see Memorandum from Stan Greenberg, Chairman and CEO,
Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, and Linda A. DiVall, President, American Viewpoint, to
Geri Palast, Executive Director, Justice at Stake Campaign (Feb. 14, 2002), available at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/contentViewer.asp?breaderumb=3,268 [hereinafter 2002
National Polls] ("Seventy-six percent (76%) of voters ... believe that campaign contributions
made to judges have at least some influence on their decisions."). See also Paul D. Carrington,
Big Money in Texas Judicial Elections: The Sickness and Its Remedies, 53 SMU L. REV. 263,
267 (2000) ("Polling data in Texas and other states confirm that most citizens believe that
contributors are getting something for their money.") (footnote omitted); Champagne, supra
note 5, at 1407-08 (citing national and state polls).
12 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 5, 17. Interest group advertising in judicial
elections was even more unrelentingly negative than in the 2000 elections for the President and
Congress. See HOLMAN & MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 4, at 33 (showing that interest groups use
attack ads in federal elections about 70% of the time).
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groups and political parties. 13 These types of advertising campaigns are known to
depress voter turnout and to increase cynicism about government-in this case,
the third branch.14
What can and should be done to resist-dare we hope, to reverse-these
trends? In recent years, a wide range of public education, advocacy, and
monitoring efforts-designed to improve understanding of judges and judicial
elections and to encourage conduct appropriate to each-have been gaining
momentum. 15 They take many forms, including conferences for academic, legal,
and lay participants; distribution of informational resources in traditional
pamphlet form or via the World Wide Web; rapid response through the media to
misleading advertising; and promotion of elevated standards of campaign
conduct. Some states have formed or are considering the formation of judicial
campaign conduct committees-official or unofficial groups that, at the very
least, offer candidates advice about their conduct during elections and, in some
cases, issue public comment on inappropriate practices and refer complaints to
disciplinary bodies. 16 All of these creative efforts to quell injudiciousness in
judicial elections can be pursued within current legal regimes.
But non-governmental efforts, even if coordinated among citizens, scholars,
journalists, lawyers, and judges, will not be enough to address the impact of big
money on campaigns for the bench. New legislation-particularly the public
financing of judicial campaigns and full disclosure of interest group spending-
13 The Michigan Democratic State General Committee ran a television ad in which the
CEO of an insurance company asks, "Lucille, where are my judges?" and Lucille answers,
"Just where they've always been, right in your pocket." Upon receiving the answer, the CEO's
jacket is opened to reveal three bewigged and robed judges dancing in the pocket with handfuls
of money. See The Rising Cost of Judicial Campaigns Spurs a Movement for Reforms, THE
POL. STANDARD, Mar. 2002, at 4; accord GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note I (describing ad
attacking Justice Alice Resnick).
14 See Shanto Iyengar, The Effects of Media-Based Campaigns on Candidate and Voter
Behavior. Implications for Judicial Elections, 35 IND. L. REV. 691,694 (2002).
15 February 14, 2002, saw the launch of the Justice at Stake Campaign, a nonpartisan
partnership of more than thirty national and state organizations working to keep our courts fair
and impartial. Recent events also prompted the convening in December 2000 of the National
Summit on Improving Judicial Selection, which brought together the chief justices of the
seventeen most populous states with judicial elections to consider potential reforms. The
Summit culminated in a twenty-point Call To Action, issued in January 2001. Pursuant to the
Call To Action, the National Center on State Courts organized a "Symposium on Judicial
Campaign Conduct and the First Amendment," held in Chicago in November 2001.
Symposium papers have been published in Volume 35, Number 3 of the 2002 Indiana Law
Review.
16 See generally Barbara Reed & Roy A. Schotland, Judicial Campaign Conduct
Committees, 35 IND. L. REV. 781, 785-88 (2002) (describing the variety of committees).
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will be required. By changing the rules, we can help to safeguard "an independent
judiciary, as free from political, economic and social pressure as possible ....
III. THE ROLES OF JUDGES
Under the U.S. Constitution, litigants have a right to appear before judges
who are fair and impartial. As the United States Supreme Court noted more than
sixty years ago:
The administration of justice by an impartial judiciary has been basic to our
conception of freedom ever since Magna Carta. It is the concern not merely of
the immediate litigants. Its assurance is everyone's concern, and it is protected by
the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. That is why this Court has
outlawed.., a judicial system which does not provide disinterested
judges .... 18
This constitutional right means that judges must "be and appear to be neither
antagonistic nor beholden to any interest, party, or person.' 19
The need to "be and appear to be" impartial when making official decisions is
what distinguishes judges from legislators and executive officers.2 0 As one court
has recognized:
[T]he contours of the judicial function make inappropriate the same kind of
particularized pledges of conduct in office that are the very stuff of campaigns
for most non-judicial offices. A candidate for the mayoralty can and often should
announce his determination to effect some program, to reach a particular result
on some question of city policy, or to advance the interests of a particular group.
It is expected that his decisions in office may be predetermined by campaign
commitment. Not so the candidate for judicial office.21
17 Peterson v. Stafford, 490 N.W.2d 418,420 (Minn. 1992).
18 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 282-83 (1941) (citations omitted).
19 Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n of La., 565 F.2d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1977).
2 0 See Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Judges
remain different from legislators and executive officials, even when all are elected... ."); see
also David B. Rottman & Roy A. Schotland, Wat Makes Judicial Elections Unique?, 34 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1369, 1369 (2001) ("[T]o appreciate the uniqueness ofjudicial elections, we must
first note the differences between judges and other elected officials.").
21 Morial, 565 F.2d at 305; accord Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir.
1991) ('The functioning of the judicial system differs markedly from those of the executive and
legislative.").
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We place limits on the promises judicial candidates may make22 because they
cannot properly keep commitments that are inconsistent with their duty to render
impartial justice.23
We also legitimately expect that other aspects of judicial conduct will differ
from that of elected officials of the political branches. We permit legislators to
meet behind closed doors with lobbyists on only one side of an issue. But we do
not allow judges to meet privately with any of the parties or lawyers involved in a
case before the court, unless all of the parties or lawyers are present in the room
(or are fully apprised and consent to private meetings, as in settlement
conferences), because we do not want to create even the appearance of favoritism.
And to promote the reality and appearance of impartiality, we constrain judges'
behavior in other ways that would not be permissible for ordinary elected
officials. 24
To be fair and impartial, judicial decisions cannot be affected by the judge's
desire to be re-elected or to be elected to a higher court.25 We want decisions
based on legally relevant considerations, not an assessment of what best secures
the judge's career. But judges are human, and threats to job security cannot easily
be ignored. Honest jurists have admitted the pressure:
The late Honorable Otto Kaus, who served on the California Supreme Court
from 1980 through 1985, used a marvelous metaphor to describe the dilemma of
deciding controversial cases while facing reelection. He said it was like finding a
crocodile in your bathtub when you go in to shave in the morning. You know it's
22 The judicial conduct codes of thirty-seven states prohibit judges and judicial candidates
from making promises other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the
office, following Canon 5 of the 1990 version of the American Bar Association Model Code of
Judicial Conduct. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICLAL CONDUCr Canon 5 (1990).
23 See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 227 ("Judges should decide cases in accordance with law
rather than with any express or implied commitments that they may have made to their
campaign supporters or to others.").
24 For example, judicial candidates in many states may not personally solicit contributions
from supporters. The candidates must instead form committees to act as agents in the campaign
fundraising process. States with non-partisan elections may also constrain the involvement of
judicial candidates with political parties.
25 Not everyone agrees with this proposition. When Tennessee Supreme Court Justice
Penny White lost her bid for retention in 1999, after voting to reverse a death sentence, the
Governor of Tennessee remarked: "Should a judge look over his shoulder to the next election in
determining how to rule on a case? I hope so." Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch: Do
Rising Threats to Judicial Independence Preclude Due Process in Capital Cases?, 31 COLUM.
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 123, 140 (1999) (edited transcript of panel discussion at 1999 ABA
Annual Meeting). The Tennessee Supreme Court thereafter began to issue press releases when
it affirmed a death sentence. See id.
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there, and you try not to think about it, but it's hard to think about much else
while you're shaving. 26
The crocodile metaphor works not only for controversial cases but also for any
category of cases important to monied interests-whether they are trial lawyers or
industry groups. When judges' professional futures hinge on their ability to attract
campaign contributions or special interest expenditures, the public may
reasonably question whether decisions remain free of bias.27
IV. THE RULES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE.
Concern about special interest influence on elected governmental officials is
not new. Campaign finance laws designed to reduce that influence have been on
the books for more than a century. We therefore have a wide range of models to
consult in designing a campaign finance system that can help address threats to
fair and impartial courts, while permitting highly qualified candidates to run for
the bench, regardless of their access to wealth. The challenge is to ensure that
rules originally developed principally (if not exclusively) to regulate political
branch elections are appropriately selected or adapted to respect the important
differences between judges and other elected officers. The proposals outlined
below are offered with that goal in mind.
26 Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State
Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1133
(1997).
27 See supra note 11. At least one federal court is on record expressing cynicism about the
impartiality of judges who must look to special interests to stay in office. See S. Christian
Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of La., 61 F. Supp. 2d 499, 513 (E.D. La. 1999),
aff'd, 252 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 464 (2001). The case involved a
challenge to the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision to revise a student practice rule in the
wake of complaints from business interests about the success of law school clinics in enforcing
environmental laws. After noting allegations of political pressure in "the form of letters and
public comments directed at the Louisiana Supreme Court justices during an election
campaign" and pointing to "the close temporal relationship between the business community's
expressions of outrage and the subsequent changes" to the rule, the district court commented:
"[I]n Louisiana, where state judges are elected, one cannot claim complete surprise when
political pressure somehow manifests itself within the judiciary." Id.; see Christine M. Durham,
The Judicial Branch in State Government: Parables of Law, Politics, and Power, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1601, 1617-18 (2001) (describing the episode); John D. Echeverria, Changing the Rules
by Changing the Players: The Environmental Issue in State Judicial Elections, 9 N.Y.U.
ENVrL. L.J. 217, 269 (2001) ("As a result of extensive special-interest financing of judicial
elections, Louisiana judges appear beholden to narrow partisan interests, drawing into question
the objectivity of the court's decision-making process.").
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A. Public Financing ofJudicial Campaigns
Elections for judges on courts of general jurisdiction are held in thirty-nine
states. An additional four states hold elections for courts of limited jurisdiction
only. In some cases, the judicial candidates face each other in direct competition;
in others, judges who are initially appointed face an up-or-down popular vote to
keep their seats. Sometimes both forms of selection are found in a single state for
judges in different geographic areas or for judges of courts at different levels. This
article recommends public financing for both contested and retention elections
that are or are likely soon to be plagued by high expenditures and destructive
politicization.
1. Contested Elections
In thirty states, judicial candidates must compete in contested elections to win
a seat on the bench. Of these states, eighteen conduct some or all of the elections
on a non-partisan basis. 28 In all of these states but one, candidates competing for
judgeships are completely dependent upon private funds to conduct their
campaigns.29
Public financing of campaigns is increasingly recognized as the most
promising way to address threats to fairness and impartiality-real or apparent-
caused by private contributions to candidates competing in judicial elections. 30
28 Candidates for the bench in Ohio and Michigan appear on the ballot without a political
party designation, but candidates are identified by political party during the election season, and
Michigan candidates are nominated by the parties. Those states have therefore been counted
among the states with partisan judicial elections. Arkansas conducted partisan elections through
2000, when the electorate approved a referendum amending the state constitution to provide for
non-partisan judicial races. See ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 17; ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-10-102
(Michie 2001). For purposes of this article, Arkansas has been included among the states with
non-partisan elections.
29 Wisconsin is currently the only state to offer public funds for judicial elections. See
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 11.50(3) (West 2001). Unfortunately, the program is sorely underfunded.
See Hon. Shirley Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 998 n.90
(2001); Charles G. Geyh, Publicly Financed Judicial Elections: An Overview, 34 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1467,1477-78, 1481 (2001).
30 At its annual mid-year meeting in February 2002, for example, the House of Delegates
of the American Bar Association (the ABA's policy-making body) reaffirmed its support for
merit selection but urged states that hold contested elections for the selection of judges to
finance judicial campaigns with public funds. See Daily Journal, Report No. 103, at 4, 22-23
(Feb. 4-5, 2002), at http://www.abanet.org/eadership/2002 dailyoumal.pdf; see also AM. BAR
Ass'N, COMM'N ON PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS, REPORT (July 2001)
[hereinafter ABA COMMIssION REPORT], available at http://www.abanet.org/
judind/report07200l.pdf (providing the findings and recommendations underlying the ABA
resolution). The proposal outlined in this article goes beyond the resolution and the ABA
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Public funding can diminish the dependence of candidates on monied interests
and the concomitant incentive to reward those supporters with favorable decisions
if elected to. the bench.31 Currently, all jurisdictions that substantially subsidize
campaigns condition the subsidies upon the candidates' acceptance of a spending
limit. The spending limit ensures that candidates will not simply accept public
money and then continue endless private fundraising. By agreeing to cap
expenditures, candidates replace private funds with public money.
Of course, spending limits reduce the overall demand for private funds even
without public financing. Raising contribution limits for candidates who agree to
limit spending-a mechanism sometimes known as a "cap-gap"--is one way to
combat the influence of money in elections without committing public funds. In
New Hampshire, for example, campaigns are conducted exclusively with private
funds, but the state quintuples the basic $1,000 contribution limit when candidates
agree to adhere to a spending limit.
A few jurisdictions, including Boulder, Colorado and Chapel Hill, North
Carolina, have successfully used publicity and political pressure to persuade some
candidates for local non-judicial office to sign voluntary spending limit pledges,
without offering either public funding or cap-gaps as an incentive.32 In Ohio,
candidates for the supreme court in 2000 also voluntarily adhered to a $500,000
spending limit, without receiving public funds, after mandatory limits at that level
were preliminarily enjoined. 33 Typically, however, some substantial financial
incentive is needed to induce acceptance of a spending limit, which must be
voluntary under the weight of current law. 34
Commission Report by affirmatively recommending: (i) the use of public funds to match
independent spending in judicial campaigns; (ii) public financing of retention elections; and
(iii) disclosure of all third-party campaign advertising expenditures.
31 The decisions with which contributors may be rewarded include discretionary
determinations whether to accept a case for high court review as well as decisions taken during
the course of ongoing litigation. Concern about the influence of campaign contributors on the
contours of the Texas Supreme Court's docket has precipitated litigation seeking to compel
disclosure of the individual justices' votes with respect to petitions for review. See Aguirre v.
Phillips, No. DR-02-CA-26 (W.D. Tex. filed May 21, 2002).
3 2 See NAT'L CMc LEAGUE, LOCAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 59-61 (1998); accord
NAT'L Civic LEAGUE, ADDENDUM TO LOCAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 17-20 (2001).
33 See Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 529-33 (6th Cir. 1999).
34 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court upheld the presidential public financing
program, which includes "voluntary acceptance of an expenditure ceiling." 424 U.S. 1, 95
(1976) (per curiam). But the Court also held that the federal government had not asserted an
interest sufficiently compelling to bar a candidate who prefers to raise private funds or to use
personal wealth to finance a campaign from doing so without limit. See id. at 52-58. Almost all
lower federal courts have since interpreted Buckley to permit voluntary spending limits, but to
preclude mandatory caps, whether or not public financing is offered. Strong arguments may
nevertheless be made for the constitutionality of mandatory spending limits. See E. JOSHUA
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Three types of public funding systems (alone or in combination) have
successfully encouraged candidates for legislative and executive office to limit
their spending.35 One system subsidizes participants by offering refunds
(Minnesota) or tax credits (Arkansas) to their contributors for contributions up to
a fixed per-person limit. This system has been proven to reduce the average size
of contributions and to increase outreach to constituents who can support their
candidate of choice (and only their candidate of choice) at little or no cost to
themselves.
A second, more common system of public financing offers funds to
candidates (rather than contributors) to match private contributions. Usually, the
public funds are available only after the candidate collects a threshold number and
amount of private contributions, which must be raised under contribution limits;
the match covers only up to a fixed sum from each contribution; and public funds
are restricted to a specified percentage of the spending cap. In 2001, for example,
New York City provided candidates who met certain threshold fundraising
requirements with $4 in public funds for every $1 raised in contributions from
city residents up to $250, until matching funds represented 55% of the spending
limit.36 The system does not eliminate private contributions, but it can
substantially reduce the candidate's dependence upon them. The threshold to
ROSENKRANZ, BUCKLEY STOPS HERE: LOOSENING THE JUDICIAL STRANGLEHOLD ON CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM 48-67 (1998), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/resources/
resourcesbooks.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2003); John C. Bonifaz, Challenging Buckley v.
Valeo: A Legal Strategy, 33 AKRON L. REv. 39, 45-54 (1999). Four U.S. Supreme Court
justices have indicated that they would in proper circumstances reconsider Buckley's ban on
mandatory expenditure ceilings. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400-05
(2000) (Breyer and Ginsburg, JJ., concurring); id. at 409-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 649-50 (1996) (Stevens and
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). For a brief discussion of mandatory spending limits applicable to
judicial campaigns, see infra Part IV.D.
35 For a discussion of the different systems, as applied to non-judicial candidates, see
ELIZABETH DANIEL, SUBSIDIZING POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: THE VARIETIES AND VALUES OF
PUBLIC FINANCING (2000), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/resources/downloads/
cfr6.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
36 See NEw YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE § 3-705(2) (2001); New York City Campaign
Finance Board, 2001 Limits, Requirements, and Public Funds, at http://www.cfb.nyc.ny.us/
program/programinfo.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2003). The Committee on Government Ethics
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (ABCNY) has suggested that such a
system could be successfully used for New York State's judicial elections, despite the fact that
the ABCNY 1'continues to believe that the best way of choosing judges is through merit
selection," which is used to select judges for New York's appellate courts. See Comm. on Gov't
Ethics, Report on Judicial Campaign Finance Reform, 56 RECORD 157, 157 n.1, 164 (2001)
[hereinafter COMM. ON GOv'T ETHICS]. Wisconsin operates an alternative partial public funding
program in which participating candidates for the bench receive a lump-sum grant at a level
well below the spending limit. See Abrahamson, supra note 29, at 998 n.90.
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qualify for public funds ensures that candidates have a certain modicum of
support, so taxpayers do not finance frivolous candidacies. The need to obtain
matchable contributions also encourages candidates to build and organize their
base throughout the campaign, promoting ongoing grassroots electoral efforts.
The availability of matching funds opens the process to candidates who might
otherwise be foreclosed by a perceived need to raise large sums of money.
A third, relatively new system provides lump-sum grants sufficient to run a
campaign to candidates who raise a threshold number of very small private
contributions, usually no more than $5 or $10 each. Candidates under this system
accept no private funds once they reach the threshold qualifying them for
participation in the program. Proponents of the program argue that it promotes
competition and political equality by putting all candidates on a level playing
field, even if their supporters can afford to make only very small contributions or
none at all.37 Critics argue that, unless the qualifying threshold is high, the system
is too expensive and too likely to foster frivolous candidacies. The system offers
no inherent post-qualification incentive to undertake grassroots organizing efforts
rather than impersonal media campaigns, but candidates report that full public
funding "allowed them to concentrate on connecting with voters rather than on
soliciting campaign contributions. ''38
This system is sometimes described as "full public funding," in contrast to the
"partial public funding" system created with matching funds or small grants. Full
public funding systems typically allow candidates to raise limited sums of seed
money from private sources and require candidates to raise qualifying
contributions from individuals. Thus, every campaign dollar does not come from
public coffers, but such programs offer "full public funding" because every
qualifying candidate receives public funds up to the full amount authorized for
campaign spending. Full public funding systems are often known as "Clean
Money" or "Clean Elections" systems. Arizona, Maine, Massachusetts, and
Vermont have implemented such systems. In October 2002, North Carolina
became the first state to enact full public funding for judicial elections. The new
law covers candidates for the state's court of appeals and supreme court. Full
public funding bills for judicial elections have been introduced in Illinois and
Wisconsin.
The partial and full public funding systems may include mechanisms-
sometimes known as "trigger" provisions-to deal with high-spending non-
participating candidates or independent spenders. Under these provisions, the
expenditure ceiling applicable to participating candidates is raised (or eliminated)
3 7 See generally MARC BRESLOW ET AL., REVITALIZING DEMOCRACY: CLEAN ELECTION
REFORM SHOWS THE WAY FORWARD (2002), at http://www.neaction.org/
revitalizingdemocracy.pdf (describing results from the 2000 elections in Maine and Arizona).
38Id. at3.
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when they face opposition spending over a certain triggering level, while their
public subsidy is continued or increased, usually up to a specified limit. Like
virtually every other element of campaign finance law, triggers have been subject
to First Amendment challenge in a number of federal circuits.39
Laws that lift expenditure ceilings for participating candidates with high-
spending non-participating opponents, while continuing or increasing public
subsidies for participants, have without exception survived constitutional
challenge. 40 Courts recognize that the trigger is necessary to " 'assuage the
wholly legitimate fears of [participants]' that they will be 'vastly outspent due to
their agreement to accept spending limits.' "41 Many state and local public
financing laws contain non-participating candidate expenditure triggers.42
Matching funds for independent expenditures are less common and have
received a less consistent response in the courts. In the first decision to consider
the issue, Day v. Holahan, the Eighth Circuit invalidated Minnesota's attempt to
add an independent spending trigger to its existing public funding system.43 As an
initial matter, the Day court concluded that the prospect of a publicly funded
response by participating candidates to independent spending deterred such
spending and therefore burdened constitutionally protected speech.44 Because
nearly all candidates joined Minnesota's public financing program, even without
the trigger, the court held that the First Amendment burden could not be justified
by the state's interest in encouraging program participation.45
But the Eighth Circuit undercut its own reasoning only two years later in
Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, when it upheld an amendment to Minnesota's law that
39 See Daggett v. Comm'n on Gov't Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir.
2000) (upholding independent expenditure trigger); Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940 (6th Cir.
1998) (upholding candidate expenditure trigger); Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544 (8th
Cir. 1996) (same); Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994) (invalidating independent
expenditure trigger).
40 See Daggett, 205 F.3d at 463-65 (upholding a system that provides additional public
funds to match non-participant spending, up to a limit); Gable, 142 F.3d at 949 (upholding a
system that allows participants to receive unlimited public matching funds of $2 for every $1 of
private funds raised); Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1550-52 (upholding a system that continued
public subsidies for participating candidates up to a pre-existing limit).
41 Gable, 142 F.3d at 947; see Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1554; Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F.
Supp. 916,927-28 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
42 For example, New York City increases the rate of matching (from 4-1 to 5-1) and the
overall amount of available public funds (from 55% of the applicable spending limit to two-
thirds of the limit) when non-participating candidate campaign receipts, spending, or financial
obligations exceed half the spending limit. See NEW YORK CITY, NY ADMIN. CODE § 3-706(3)
(2001).
43 See 34 F.3d 1356, 1359-62 (8th Cir. 1994).
44 See id. at 1359-60.
45 See id. at 1361-62.
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allowed spending by non-participating candidates to trigger a waiver of the
expenditure ceiling applicable to their participating opponents who thereafter
remained eligible to receive public subsidies.46 The court commented:
The expenditure limitation waiver, which permits a publicly financed candidate
to exceed the expenditure limits while retaining the public subsidy when opposed
by a nonparticipating candidate who has spent or received contributions beyond
the triggering amounts spelled out in the statute is simply an attempt by the State
to avert a powerful disincentive for participation in its public financing scheme:
namely, a concern of being grossly outspent by a privately financed opponent
with no expenditure limit.47
Precisely the same could be said about the trigger challenged in Day, except that
the participating candidate's fear of being outspent is prompted by privately
financed independent groups with no expenditure limit. As the First Circuit
commented in Daggett v. Commission on Government Ethics and Election
Practices, "the continuing vitality of Day is open to question."48
The Daggett court squarely rejected Day's reasoning in upholding Maine's
independent expenditure trigger.49 Noting that the complaint about Maine's
trigger "boil[ed] down to a claim of a First Amendment right to outraise and
outspend an opponent," the court stated:
Appellants misconstrue the meaning of the First Amendment's protection of
their speech. They have no right to speak free from response-the purpose of the
First Amendment is to "secure the 'widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources .... '" The public funding system in no
way limits the quantity of speech one can engage in or the amount of money one
can spend engaging in political speech, nor does it threaten censure or penalty for
such expenditures. 50
This reasoning echoed a similar analysis in the court below. Speaking of the
trigger's opponents, that court reasoned:
Their view of free speech is that there is no point in speaking if your opponent
gets to be heard as well. The question is not whose message is more persuasive,
but whose message will be heard. The general premise of the First Amendment
as interpreted by the Supreme Court, on the other hand, is that it preserves and
fosters a marketplace of ideas.... In that view of the world, more speech is
4 6 See 101 F.3d at 1551-55.
47 Id. at 1551.
48 205 F.3d at 465 n.25.
4 9 See id. at 464-65.
5 0 Id. at 464 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,49 (1976) (per curiam)).
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better. If a privately funded candidate puts out his/her candidacy and ideas to the
public, the public can only gain when the opposing candidate speaks in return.
This "marketplace of ideas" metaphor does not recognize a disincentive to speak
in the first place merely because some other person may speak as well. 51
Following the decision in Daggett, lawsuits filed by opponents of Arizona's full
public funding program did not challenge that state's independent expenditure
trigger.
With this background in mind, the question becomes: Which of the systems
is the best model for judicial public financing? Of the three, the one that would
appear best calculated to promote the reality and appearance of impartial courts is
the full public funding system, with supplementary matching funds triggered by
high-spending non-candidates and independent expenditures. This system comes
closest to breaking the dependency of judicial candidates on monied interests. In
doing so, it may also encourage highly qualified candidates from poor
communities and communities of color to run for judicial office, 52 thereby
elevating competence and diversity on the bench and increasing the potential for
fair and equal justice.
Full public financing may be especially important in states with non-partisan
elections. The political party designation on the ballot is one of the few pieces of
information many voters ever receive about judicial candidates. Without the party
label, "[v]oters lose their main cue for information on who to vote for and, lacking
more relevant information on individual candidates, rely on other factors such as
ballot position or name recognition." 53 Such a system confers a tremendous
advantage upon candidates with the financial resources or monied supporters to
run advertising campaigns. To avoid skewing elections in this way, any move to
non-partisan judicial elections should be coupled with a full public financing
system to allow all candidates an opportunity to communicate meaningfully with
voters.
But a full public funding system for judicial campaigns must be introduced
with care because some of the virtues of the system in elections for political
offices may in fact militate against the program where the judiciary is concerned.
For example, by encouraging the entry of candidates who would not otherwise
consider a run for elective office, full public funding may introduce competition
51 Daggett, 74 F. Supp. 2d 53, 58 (D. Me. 1999) (citation omitted), affd, 205 F.3d 445
(I st Cir. 2000).
52 See BRESLOW ET AL., supra note 37, at 24-25 ("[H]igh percentages of participating
women and Latinos chose to become candidates in 2000 because Clean Elections funding was
available.").
53 Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justice in State Courts: The Ballot Box or the Backroom?,
41 S. Tx. L. REv. 1197, 1206 (2000).
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where little previously existed.54 Although we generally believe that more
competition is better, we should not so easily leap to that conclusion in proposing
structures to regulate judicial elections.
In jurisdictions that have already managed to secure a diverse and qualified
bench, we may in fact want to discourage competition. After all, the idea that a
well-qualified judge should be freed as much as possible from political pressure is
what explains the federal selection syster-both the appointive process and life
tenure. The reasons to support full public funding programs are therefore most
persuasive when judicial elections are already highly competitive or when more
competitive elections hold some promise for diversifying and improving the
quality of the bench. Introducing full public funding in other circumstances may
serve little purpose and invite problems by bringing in money that would not
otherwise be spent on campaigns. In those situations, alternative campaign
finance rules, such as strict contribution limits, might better address concerns
about the influence of big money on decision-making. 55
Concerns about undesirable competition may also support lifting the usual
qualification requirements when judges seeking re-election choose to participate
in public funding programs. Judges who have previously won election to the
bench have already established themselves as serious candidates, and we
generally want both to discourage them from looking to the "home crowd" for
affirmation and to limit the influence of private money on their re-election.56 We
may therefore wish to permit their participation in public funding programs
without the need to collect even small qualifying contributions. 57 Incumbent
officials of the political branches are not entitled to special qualification rules
because we want them to remain attentive to the interests of their constituents and
therefore reasonably ask them to confirm public support with each election.
Judges are different.
In other words, certain policies that would be derided as "incumbent
protection" in non-judicial elections might well be acceptable in judicial selection
systems. After all, life tenure-surely the most extreme form of incumbent
54 BRESLOW ET AL., supra note 37, at 21.
55 Cf Big Money in Texas Judicial Elections, supra note 11, at 273 (suggesting that
stricter disqualification rules for judges that have accepted contributions from lawyers or parties
that appear before them may suffice to address concerns about the undue influence of money on
trial courts).
56 Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Judicial Independence, 20 HAW. L. REV. 603
(1998) (stressing that judges "must strive constantly to do what is legally right, all the more so
when the result is not the one... 'the home crowd' wants") (quoting Hon. William H.
Rehnquist, Dedicatory Address: Act Well Your Part: Therein All Honor Lies, 7 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 227,229-30 (1980)).
57 The public financing bill introduced in North Carolina originally included this feature.
See N.C. S.B. 1054 § 163-278.64(b).
2003]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
protection-is constitutionally guaranteed to federal judges, even though it is
unthinkable for the political branches. Qualifying rules that differentiate between
judicial incumbents and challengers should therefore be subject to a different
equal protection analysis than rules making such a distinction among candidates
for the political branches. Such rules in non-judicial elections might constitute
"invidious discrimination against challengers as a class,"58 but the compelling
governmental interest in safeguarding the reality and appearance of judicial
impartiality justifies the distinction in elections for the bench.59
That being said, proponents of full public funding should not fall prey to the
claim that programs with spending limits will systematically entrench
incumbents. Under that argument, incumbents have such an inherent electoral
advantage that challengers who operate under a spending limit equal to that
applicable to the competition will have no real chance to compete. Given the
unequal starting points, in other words, equal spending necessarily preserves the
incumbents' greater name recognition and is therefore discriminatory against
challengers.60 The Supreme Court has twice rejected this complaint in upholding
contribution limits, and the argument is equally unsupported as a challenge to full
public funding programs.
The argument fails because the unquestionable electoral advantage of
incumbents derives in part from their greater ability to raise funds, which
becomes irrelevant when incumbents participate in a full public funding system.
By far the vast majority of challengers in private financing systems fail to raise or
spend anywhere near as much as their opponents. Full public financing programs
with spending limits equalize candidate expenditures and thus reduce the relative
advantage of participating incumbents.61 Indeed, empirical analysis shows that,
even without public funding, spending limits increase the competitiveness of
challengers (although they inescapably continue to face uphill battles to unseat
incumbents).62 As long as programs are voluntary, challengers who believe that
58 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 31 (1976) (per curiam).
59 Courts may rightfully be suspicious of legislators who use campaign finance laws to
insulate themselves from effective electoral challenge. See Nixon v. Shrink Miss. Gov't PAC,
528 U.S. 377, 404 (2000) (Breyer and Ginsburg, JJ., concurring). But legislatures seeking to
protect judicial independence-which may be exercised, after all, as a check on their own
institutional power-deserve deference to their judgment.
60 See David Bamhizer, "On the Make": Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of the
American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REv. 361,417 (2001).
61 Cf CoMM. ON Gov'T ETHIcs, supra note 36, at 165 ("A strong public financing plan
would be of even greater benefit to challengers, who find it particularly difficult to raise funds
against an incumbent who has likely served on the bench in a community for many years, and
who likely has his or her party's backing ....).
62 Expert testimony and supporting documentary evidence to this effect were presented at
trial during the defense of California Proposition 208. The trial transcript and exhibits and are
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they can compete more effectively by opting out of the public funding system are
entitled to do so. The fact that full public funding systems may thus heighten
competition is precisely what militates in favor of caution when they are being
considered for judicial elections that have not yet become expensive or
contentious.
Of course, a full public funding system can alleviate the problems presented
by privately financed judicial elections that are highly competitive, politicized,
and costly only if the vast majority of candidates for the bench participate in the
program. Our limited experience with such programs constrains our ability to
predict whether judicial candidates will participate voluntarily at sufficient rates to
address real and perceived threats to fair and impartial courts.63 States and
localities with longstanding partial public financing systems have, however,
achieved very substantial participation rates.64 The increasingly vocal and
widespread concern among elected judges about the negative influence of
privately financed judicial campaigns on public confidence in the judiciary
suggests, moreover, that competing candidates for the bench may be more willing
to limit spending than candidates for executive or legislative offices. 65
2. Public Financing of Retention Elections
In sixteen states, judicial candidates do not compete face-to-face for seats on
the bench, but judges nevertheless face popular election. These states employ a
selection system whereby judges are initially appointed by the governor or state
legislature, with or without input from a nominating commission, for a (usually
short) term after which the judges face a "yes"-or-"no" vote to retain their seats.
Judges who win retention serve for another (usually longer) term until the next
retention election. Judges who fail to receive the requisite percentage of "yes"
on file with the author. The trial court preliminarily enjoined the entire initiative without
discussing this evidence, see Cal. ProLife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, 989 F.
Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1998), aft'd, 164 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2000), and the case was ultimately
mooted by the passage of a superseding initiative (Proposition 34) in 2000.
63 In 2000, the first election year of operation, almost half of Senate candidates and 30%
of House candidates participated in Maine's full public financing program. In Arizona, 7% of
Senate candidates and 20% of House candidates ran with public funding. See REVITALIZING
DEMOCRACY, supra note 37, at 3. But the numbers are higher for the 2002 election. Nearly 88%
of candidates for statewide office in Arizona are participating in the state's full public funding
program in 2002. See Chip Scutari & Mary Jo Pitzl, Elections Law Sets New Tone for State,
ARIz. REPUBLIC, June 9,2002 (on file with author).
64 Minnesota, for example, has almost 100% participation rates. See supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
65 See COMM. ON GOV'T ETHics, supra note 36, at 164 (arguing that even a generous
partial public financing system "would provide a significant incentive" for participation on a
voluntary basis).
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votes in the retention election lose their seats, and the appointive process begins
anew. In addition to the states using the selection system just described, Illinois
and Pennsylvania use retention elections to determine whether judges who
initially won office through contested elections may keep their seats; in New
Mexico, judges are first appointed, then run in a partisan contested election, and
the winner thereafter faces retention elections.
Public financing for retention elections has not received much attention or
support.66 Some supporters of full public funding for contested judicial elections
have balked at the concept, citing concern that the state will appear to be
protecting incumbents by providing subsidies to sitting judges but not to groups
opposing their retention. 67 For the reasons explained below, however, appointed
judges facing organized campaigns to defeat their retention may be particularly
good candidates for public funding, which should be constitutional under existing
precedent.
Before proceeding to the constitutional analysis, it is worth recalling the
rationale for appointing judges as an initial matter. The idea is to shield judges not
from the influence of politics (which unavoidably enters in appointive systems as
well) but from the compromising pressures of contested elections. Appointment is
supposed to secure highly qualified judges rather than those who win office by
pandering to majority views (which are often inconsistent with the rights of
66 One sentence recommending that "public financing of contested retention elections
ought to be seriously considered" appears in Hon. B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hansen,
Judicial Retention Elections, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1429, 1440 (2001). Bills have been
introduced in the Illinois legislature that would provide full public funding for contested state
Supreme Court elections, but not for the state's retention elections. See llinois S.B. 1578 and
H.B. 1704 (2002).
67 See ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 30, at 45. The ABA Commission's
conclusions that "contentious, expensive elections will occur only when voters are dissatisfied
with thejudge's performance" and that "significant opposition to ajudge's retention is likely to
arise only when dissatisfaction levels are high," see id., disregard the actual dynamics of
negative advertising campaigns in retention elections. Well-funded opposition campaigns in
retention elections tend to target judges for policy reasons- often on the basis of a single issue
or a single decision-not for reasons of competence. See Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization of
Judicial Retention Elections: The Defeat of Justices Lanphier and White, in RESEARCH ON
JUDICIAL SELECTION 51, 53 (Am. Judicature Soc'y ed., 2000). In such circumstances, the
group's advertising campaign may create voter dissatisfaction, but it is unclear whether the
public interests in preserving impartial and high quality courts are served by depriving the judge
of public funds with which to defend his or her record and to educate the voters about
appropriate criteria for selecting judges. As the ABA previously recognized: "Never is there
more potential for judicial accountability being distorted and judicial independence being
jeopardized than when a judge is campaigned against because of a stand on a single issue or
even in a single case." AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE
ON LAWYERS' POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS, PART Two 6 (1998).
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unpopular minorities) or by raising large sums from contributors seeking to
influence decisions of the court.
When they are selected for judicial office, appointed judges thus may not
have a broad base of popular support, and they may possess no skills, experience,
or interest in fundraising. Moreover, they will likely know that sitting judges have
traditionally won retention with little controversy-and indeed without raising a
dime. 68 Having just been elevated to the bench, the appointees may be disinclined
to spend their first years in office actively courting what may prove to be a wholly
unnecessary base of campaign contributors for a retention election, leaving
themselves particularly ill equipped to combat a well-funded negative campaign
launched against them late in the election season.69
States concerned enough about protecting the integrity and quality of their
courts from the political pressures of contested elections to appoint their judges in
the first place should create structures that continue to insulate appointees as
much as possible from pressures to behave like other incumbent elected officials.
Incumbents of the political branches often track public opinion polls for guidance
with respect to their policy-making (or at least the spin they put on it), and their
campaign fundraising is almost always a year-round process. Judges should
neither be playing to the home crowd nor compromising even the appearance of
impartiality by routinely collecting contributions from the lawyers and parties
who appear or are likely to appear before them in court. But those unattractive
options are essentially the only ones available to sitting judges whose independent
decision-making is increasingly likely to subject them to an organized attack in a
retention election.70 Offering public financing to such judges provides comfort
that they will be able to respond if attacked for unpopular decisions and thus helps
to ensure that retention elections do not undermine the integrity of the courts that
states have attempted to protect with their appointive process.
68 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 11 n.6, 12 (showing that of the seventeen
appointive states holding retention elections for supreme court candidates, nine saw no
fundraising whatsoever and, in an additional three, only one candidate raised any funds, over a
ten-year period). When judges seeking retention do face opposition, however, average
fundraising nearly reaches the level of non-partisan contested elections. See id. at 12 & n.9.
69 Moreover, unlike the incumbent judges, the opposition groups are not constrained by
codes ofjudicial ethics and, as is explained in greater detail infra Part IV.B, they may structure
their campaigns to evade campaign finance requirements. See generally Gerald F. Uelmen,
Commentary: Are We Reprising a Finale or an Overture?, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 2069 (1988)
(arguing that structural imbalance makes retention elections unfair to judges).
70 See Hon. B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hansen, Judicial Retention Elections, 34
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1429, 1431-36 (2001) (describing a trend in retention elections to become
"well-funded, hard-fought, and emotionally charged contests"); Schotland, supra note 2, at 861
n.53 (raising "concern about whether the long-term record in retention elections may be
turning").
2003]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Publicly subsidizing judges standing for retention is not that different from
providing matching funds for independent expenditures in contested races. Maine
provides public funds to participating candidates who face independent
expenditures against them or in favor of their opponents, and the system has been
upheld against constitutional challenge 7 I-even though the participating
candidate may be an incumbent, the opponent may not reach the public financing
qualifying threshold, and the subsidy is never available to independent groups.
The appearance of incumbent protection that arises when only an incumbent
receives public funds does not defeat the state's interest in combating the reality
and appearance of corruption and in encouraging participation in the public
financing system, whether in contested or retention elections.
Moreover, the concern about incumbent protection is inapposite in a context
where the equal treatment of two classes-incumbents and challengers-is not at
issue. Even in contested elections, such equal protection claims are available only
in limited circumstances. As the Buckley Court recognized: "Absent record
evidence of invidious discrimination against challengers as a class, a court should
generally be hesitant to invalidate legislation which on its face imposes
evenhanded restrictions."72 But retention elections are intentionally designed to
eliminate the contest with a challenger, so the possibility of discrimination is
illusory. The very same state interests that justify rejection of contested elections
in favor of appointive systems also support public financing for retention
elections.
Payment mechanisms in a full public funding system for retention elections
would have to ensure that judges seeking retention could meaningfully counter
opposition campaigns, which are often designed to hit shortly before the election
when there is almost no time to respond. The most promising system would
appear to be one that conveyed an amount adequate for a retention campaign to a
special bank account established by the judge's retention committee well in
advance of the election. The committee would be authorized to commit only a
modest portion of the funds in anticipation of possible attack and to spend the rest
once opposition expenditures approached that same level. The two-stage funding
process would protect the public funds in the event that no opposition campaign
materialized. The initial commitment is analogous to the reduced grant made
available to unopposed general election candidates under Maine's full public
funding program, while the release of the remaining amount functions much as
limited matching funds do. Independent groups may ultimately have the resources
to outspend sitting judges, but the system will give judges the ability to convey
their point of view, without raising concerns about the influence of private
71 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
72 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 31 (1976); see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 389 n.4 (2000).
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contributors. As in any public financing system, any unexpended funds would be
returned to the state for future use.
Critics may argue that the analogy with Maine's system fails because
unopposed general election candidates originally were entitled to no public funds,
and unopposed candidates would still appear not to be entitled to receive
matching funds for independent expenditures. 73 Admittedly, the analogy between
the Maine program and that proposed here for retention elections is imperfect
because there are salient differences between the unopposed candidate and the
judge seeking retention. After all, an unopposed candidate in a contested election
is unlikely to face an independently financed attack campaign because the
expenditures (except in extraordinary circumstances) will not reduce the
candidate's chances of winning. By contrast, such a campaign can unseat a judge
in a retention election. The differences between the Maine system and the
proposed public funding system for retention elections reflect the different
dynamics of the campaigns financed in each. Judges can be expected to
participate in a public funding program only if it is structured to allow them to
participate meaningfully in the debate about retention, as the two-staged process
described above permits. The retention election funding program is thus justified
by the compelling interest in encouraging participation, which in turn protects the
integrity of the state's courts.
3. Publicly Subsidized In-Kind Benefits
In both contested and retention elections, states can reduce demand for
private fundraising, even without otherwise committing public funds to judicial
campaigns, by supplying in-kind benefits that cut the costs of campaigning. Free
television time is probably the most valuable in-kind benefit that statewide
judicial candidates could receive, but states have limited authority to regulate that
medium. 74 Voter guides are also a relatively inexpensive form of in-kind benefit.
73 In 2001, the Maine legislature amended subsections (7) and (8) of section 1125 of the
state code to allow unopposed general election candidates, who were previously ineligible for
any public funds, to receive 40% of the otherwise available grant. 2001 Me. Laws ch. 465 § 5.
The matching funds provision allows for an additional distribution when "the sum of a [non-
participating] candidate's expenditures or obligations, or funds raised or borrowed, whichever is
greater, alone or in conjunction with independent expenditures" exceeds the initial lump sum
grant, suggesting that there must be an opposing candidate for a participant to receive matching
funds for independent expenditures. See ME. REv. ST. ANN., tit. 21A, § 1125(8)(D) (West
2001). Of course, as noted below, independent expenditures are highly unlikely in a contested
election with an unopposed candidate.
74 See Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 40-42 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that
Rhode Island may offer participating candidates free television time on community antenna
television or on public broadcasting stations operating under state jurisdiction, on the
assumption that non-participating candidates may petition for equal time and treatment). States
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But a system that offers only modest in-kind benefits can only modestly reduce
the demand for private money because a more substantial incentive is usually
needed to convince candidates to cap spending.75
Publicly funded voter guides should nevertheless be part of any public
financing system for judicial elections.76 Judicial elections are widely
characterized by low voter turnout and high voter "rolloff,' '77 and voters often
explain their failure to vote by citing their lack of adequate information about the
candidates. Voter guides can help to remedy that problem at a relatively low cost
to taxpayers. If a balky legislature refuses to appropriate funds for printing and
distribution costs, the guides may be posted on the internet, and states can
encourage other organizations to link their web sites to the web page with official
information. The guides should educate the public not only about the candidates
but also about the role of judges and the special nature ofjudicial elections.
4. Mandatory Spending Limits
The distinctive role of courts in our constitutional system also provides the
basis for mandatory spending limits in campaigns for the bench. Although courts
to date have refused to tailor campaign finance jurisprudence to the special
features of judicial elections,78 the state interests uniquely implicated in such
could purchase airtime, of course, and distribute it at no cost to qualified candidates. One
commentator has also suggested that states convene public debates among judicial candidates
and provide audio and video recordings of the proceedings to radio and television stations that
agree to air them unedited and without charge to the candidates. See Carrington, supra note 11,
at 272. Both of these proposals would offer free media exposure to candidates, but to date
neither has been implemented in any state.
75 See Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in
Highest State Courts, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 121 (1998) (noting the relatively low cost
of voter guides). Free publication of a statement in a voter guide is unlikely to induce agreement
to abide by spending limits, but Carrington suggests that candidates' receipts of the benefit
could be conditioned upon "some commitments regarding their election conduct," such as
expedited intemet disclosure. Id. Whether publicly funded benefits could also be used to exact
adherence to elevated standards of campaign conduct is thoughtfully explored by Richard
Briffault in Public Funds or Publicly Funded Benefits and the Regulation of Judicial
Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REV. 819 (2002).
76 See Carrington, supra note 75, at 120-21; Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges'
Campaign Financing: Are State Judges' Robes the Emperor's Clothes of American
Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 127-28 (1985).
77 See Dann & Hansen, supra note 66, at 1430 (" 'Rolloff' [sic] in voting is the tendency
of voters to refrain from voting on judges at all."); see also Maute, supra note 53, at 1221
(noting that holding judicial elections with general elections "increases voter turnout, [but] the
'roll-off' phenomenon recognizes that many voters do not cast votes on judicial candidates").
78 See Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 529 (6th Cir. 1999). In Zeller v. Florida Bar,
which involved a challenge to time restrictions on judicial campaign fundraising, the state
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elections provide a compelling justification for limiting spending by judicial
candidates. 79 Detailed arguments in favor of mandatory spending limits are
beyond the scope of this article, but the fundamental rationale is clear: As long as
expenditure ceilings are high enough to ensure that all candidates can convey
their message to the voters, concerns for fair and impartial courts and for open
and equal access to judicial office should trump the First Amendment burdens
imposed by the caps.
B. Disclosure of Contributions and Expenditures in Judicial Elections
Any system of public funding must also include provisions ensuring full
disclosure, readily accessible to the electorate, of all campaign contributions and
expenditures. 80 Disclosure is essential not only to advance the informational and
integrity-promoting interests identified in Buckley, but also to effectuate key
provisions of the public funding program--the distribution of matching funds.
The constitutionality of financial reporting requirements for candidates, political
committees ("PACs"), and political parties is well established. But a loophole in
current disclosure law allows much of the most controversial spending in judicial
appears not even to have raised the due process interest in an impartial judiciary in its defense of
the provision. 909 F. Supp. 1518 (N.D. Fla. 1995). The court, on the other hand, cited other
provisions of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct as grounds for finding the challengers likely
to succeed in demonstrating that the time limit was not narrowly tailored to prevent judicial
corruption. See id. at 1527.
79 See COMM. ON GOv'T ETHics, supra note 36, at 161-62 & n.3 (arguing for the
constitutionality of spending limits in judicial elections, notwithstanding the decision in Suster);
see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for Contribution
and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 133, 135 (1998)
("Buckley's rejection of expenditure restrictions for presidential and congressional elections is
distinguishable because of the unique nature of the judicial role and the importance of judicial
independence."); Jason M. Levien & Stacie L. Fatka, Cleaning Up Judicial Elections:
Examining the First Amendment Limitations on Judicial Campaign Regulation, 2 MICH. L. &
PO"'Y REv. 71, 85-88 (1997) ("While Buckley found a compelling state interest in protecting
against corruption or the appearance thereof in the political process, there is an additional state
interest in the regulation of speech in judicial elections.").
80 Many states require disclosure of funds raised and spent by candidates, parties, and
PACs in judicial elections, but the record on access is spotty: "Even when disclosure
requirements do apply .... collecting campaign finance information can be a matter of sorting
through thousands of pages of campaign finance statements stored in dingy state government
offices-an extremely resource-intensive endeavor at best." GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at
20. Files may be lost, and even when they are available, the cost of copying them may be
prohibitive. Mandatory, universal electronic filing would be a solution, but only if (1) the
underlying disclosure laws require reporting of expenditures at a level of specificity that makes
it possible to ascertain precisely how money is spent and by whom, and (2) the data are then
provided to the public in an easily searchable format, such as an interactive web site. See id.
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elections-advertising by interest groups that do not register as PACs-to escape
regulation.81
The loophole that shields interest groups from disclosure can become a
particular problem for a full public funding system. Special interests wishing to
influence the course of judicial elections will have no outlet other than
independent spending for the monies that might otherwise have been contributed
directly to candidates. Under full public financing systems, independent
expenditures thus have the potential to play a more substantial role than they
would in elections conducted with partial or no public funding. Moreover,
candidates whose supporters announce their intention to run expensive
independent advertising campaigns may find it easier to accept expenditure limits,
but acceptance of the limits under those circumstances increases the threat to real
and perceived impartiality. 82 Disclosure may or may not have an influence on the
total amount of independent spending, but the absence of disclosure most
certainly deprives the public of the means to assess its impact.83 When reporting
of independent expenditures triggers the release of matching funds, evasion of
disclosure requirements can undermine the public funding program.
The disclosure loophole arises from an interpretation of the Federal Election
Campaign Act ("FECA") in Buckley. The Buckley Court was asked to decide
whether independent expenditures could be limited in amount and included
within the scope of reporting requirements. The Court concluded that the federal
expenditure caps could not be imposed, but ruled that the government could
require disclosure of spending on "communications that expressly advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate."'84 In an explanatory footnote,
the Court provided illustrative examples of express advocacy, such as" 'vote for,'
'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,'
'defeat,' 'reject.' "85 The Court adopted this "magic words" test as a narrowing
construction of the challenged independent expenditure provisions in FECA,
which would otherwise have been unconstitutionally vague and overbroad,
thereby leaving open the possibility that Congress would draft a new law
avoiding FECA's constitutional infirmities. Magic words were supposed to
distinguish communications that could be subject to disclosure requirements from
"issue advocacy," which was entitled to greater First Amendment protection.
81 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 18-19 & n.16.
82 See Carrington, supra note 75, at 117 ("[E]xpenditure limits ... do not prevent
independent "issues advocates" from makingjudges dependent upon them.").
83 See Goldberg & Kozlowski, supra note 9, at 757 (noting that sunshine may embarrass
some contributors); cf Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor
Anonymity to Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837, 860-66 (1998)
(suggesting that donor anonymity increases the likelihood of independent issue ads).
84 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
85 See id. at 44 n.52.
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The fundamental problem with the magic words test, however, is that it is
easily and routinely circumvented by advertisers who wish to avoid campaign
finance requirements. An analysis of approximately 845,000 television
advertising spots in the 2000 federal elections prompted the following comment:
When the magic words test is applied to campaign advertisements in the real
world, it has very little, if any, correlation with electioneering activity. Political
ads by party committees ... almost never employ magic words. Even candidate
ads, which are defined as electioneering by law, employ magic words only 10%
of the time. The low percentage of candidate ads using magic words highlights
how unnecessary such words are to convey an explicit electioneering message.
That parties and groups can also effectively convey their electioneering messages
without magic words is not surprising .... 86
In 2000, interest groups spent nearly $100 million on sham issue advocacy-ads
that were unmistakable electioneering rather than mere discussion of issues but
that slipped under the regulatory radar screen by avoiding magic words.87
Although group expenditures in judicial elections have not yet reached this scale,
the same techniques are used to evade disclosure of funding sources for and
amounts spent on bogus issue ads in supreme court campaigns. 88
"Express advocacy" need not be interpreted to create such a gaping loophole.
Under the Ninth Circuit ruling in FEC v. Furgatch, for example, a message is
deemed to be express advocacy if "when read as a whole, and with limited
reference to external events, [it could] be susceptible of no other reasonable
interpretation but as an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate." 89
Furgatch identified three components of its test:
First, even if it is not presented in the clearest, most explicit language, speech is
"express" for present purposes if its message is unmistakable and unambiguous,
suggestive of only one plausible meaning. Second, speech may only be termed
"advocacy ' if it presents a clear plea for action, and thus speech that is merely
informative is not covered by [FECA]. Finally, it must be clear what action is
advocated. Speech cannot be "express advocacy".., when reasonable minds
could differ as to whether it encourages a vote for or against a candidate or
encourages the reader to take some other kind of action.90
86 HOLMAN & MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 4, at 29.
87 See id.
88 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 18 (reporting that only 1.2% of television spots
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A few other courts have rejected the magic words test in favor of other standards
for express advocacy. 91 But many-in fact, most-lower federal courts and state
courts have since interpreted Buckley to foreclose disclosure requirements
applicable to spending on communications that do not use magic words or close
synonyms.92
Even courts that have adopted the magic words test have in some cases
recognized its obvious ineffectuality. 93 Most recently, in Chamber of Commerce
of the United States v. Moore, the Fifth Circuit overturned a lower court ruling
that advertisements in support of candidates for Mississippi's Supreme Court
were subject to the state's disclosure requirements. The Court of Appeals
commended the district court's "thoughtful and reasoned opinion" but held that
the ads could not be regulated unless they contained "explicit terms advocating
specific electoral action."9 4 Finding its holding "compelled" by Supreme Court
precedent, the Fifth Circuit nevertheless admitted: "We recognize that the result
91 See FEC v. Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d 45, 61 (D.D.C. 1999) (recognizing
Supreme Court precedent for a "more context-sensitive approach to 'express advocacy' ");
Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n, 4 P.3d 808, 821, 823-
24 (Wash. 2000) (purporting to reject Furgatch's contextual approach but using it to explain
why one of two ads constituted express advocacy); State ex rel. Crumpton v. Keisling, 982 P.2d
3, 10-11 (Or. App. 1999) (adopting an approach "somewhat less restrictive" than the Furgatch
test), review denied, 994 P.2d 132, 132 (Ore. 2000); Elections Bd. of Wis. v. Wis. Mfr. &
Commerce, 597 N.W.2d 721, 733-34 (Wis. 1999) (observing that Furgatch provided "an
attractive alternative" to the magic words approach but declining to decide whether context
could be considered in deciding whether a communication was express advocacy). A more
detailed analysis of these cases is available in WRITING REFORM: A GUIDE TO DRAFTING STATE
& LOCAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS VII-12-14 (Deborah Goldberg ed., rev. ed. 2001),
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/progjhtmanual.html. [hereinafter
WRITING REFORM].
92 See Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187, 190 (5th Cir.
2002); Va. Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379, 379 (4th Cir. 2001); Iowa Right
to Life Comm. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 969-70 (8th Cir. 1999); Me. Right to Life Comm. v.
FEC, 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996). The Second Circuit invalidated provisions of a Vermont law
that required disclosure of communications that "implicitly" advocated the election or defeat of
a candidate, or that mentioned a candidate within a particular period of time but did not
"expressly advocate the election or defeat of the candidate," without holding that express
advocacy was nothing more than magic words. See Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 221
F.3d 376, 389 (2d Cir. 2000). The Tenth Circuit made a similar decision, citing the Second
Circuit opinion, in Citizens for Responsible Government State Political Action Committee v.
Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1193-94 (1Oth Cir. 2000).
93 Even the Buckley Court acknowledged that the test would allow some electioneering to
escape regulation. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976). Given campaign advertising
practices in 1976, however, it is unlikely that the Buckley Court could have anticipated the
extent to which the loophole would swallow the law.
94 Moore, 288 F.3d 187, 190.
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we reach in this case may be counterintuitive to a commonsense understanding of
the message conveyed by the television political advertisements at issue."9 5
The controversy with respect to the magic words test will likely soon be
resolved, when the Supreme Court considers the constitutionality of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA"). 96 BCRA amends FECA to
create a new category of "electioneering communications" that may be regulated
notwithstanding the absence of magic words.97 The strong arguments in favor of
the constitutionality of those provisions are beyond the scope of this article,98 but
if the provisions are upheld, they are likely to become the model for efforts to
obtain full disclosure of third-party advertising expenditures in state elections,
including elections for the bench.
Efforts to implement a test modeled on BCRA's electioneering
communications definition may succeed in judicial elections even if BCRA's
approach is found constitutionally unacceptable for federal elections. The First
Amendment doctrines invoked in the challenges to BCRA are the same as those
invoked in Buckley: vagueness and overbreadth. BCRA's test is unlikely to be
found unconstitutionally vague-sponsors can tell with certainty whether their
95 Id. at 198-99.
96 BCRA provides for expedited review by a three-judge panel with direct appeal to the
Supreme Court. See BCRA § 403 (Law. Co-op., 2002). Oral argument on the eleven
constitutional challenges filed against the law is scheduled for December 4, 2002. See Order,
McConnell v. FEC, No. 02-582 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2002) (order setting scheduling and
procedures), at http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/gs/cf/debate/CoutOrder.pdf.
97 As defined under BCRA:
The term "electioneering communication" means any broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication which-
(1) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office;
(11) is made within-
(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office sought by
the candidate; or
(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus
of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by
the candidate; and
(Ill) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate for an office other
than President or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate.
BCRA § 201(a) (adding new subsection (f) to 2 U.S.C. § 434) (Law. Co-op., 2002).
98 The author's employer, the Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law, is part
of a legal team representing BCRA's congressional sponsors in support of the constitutionality
of the Act. For Brennan Center documents on BCRA and predecessor bills, including the
McCain-Feingold and Shays-Meehan bills and the Snowe-Jeffords amendment, see
http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/progmccain-fein030l.html (last visited Jan. 30,
2003). Other useful resources, presenting both sides of the case, are available through the
Brookings Institution's Campaign Finance web page at http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/gs/
cf/cf hp.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
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ads refer to a clearly identified candidate and whether they are broadcast within
the specified time period. But the Supreme Court is likely to look more closely at
claims that the test captures substantial amounts of genuine issue advocacy and
thus is constitutionally overbroad.99 If the test is applied exclusively to judicial
election advertising, however, the latter question may not even be close. After all,
the type of ad that refers to a clearly identified legislative candidate shortly before
an election and yet might plausibly claim to be genuine issue advocacy-for
example, "Call Senator Smith and tell her to protect the people, not the HMOs"-
has no obvious analogue during the judicial campaign season. We do not see-
and hope never to see-television commercials urging voters to "Call Judge
Smith and tell her to invalidate tort reform." There may thus be so little empirical
evidence of ads containing "mere discussion of public issues that by their nature
raise the names of certain [judicial candidates]" 00-if there is any at all-that
there is no basis for finding a test modeled on BCRA substantially overbroad
when limited to advertising in elections for the bench.
Even if the proportion of genuine issue ads run shortly before judicial
elections were the same as that run before federal elections, and BCRA's
disclosure requirements for electioneering communications failed constitutional
scrutiny, requirements modeled on BCRA might survive if limited to campaigns
for the bench. The outcome could be different because a finding of "substantial"
overbreadth under First Amendment doctrine is not an arithmetical calculation;
the conclusion represents a normative judgment that there is an inadequate
justification for burdening some of the speech governed by a challenged rule. As
one commentator has put it:
When a state regulates or burdens speech on the basis of content in order to
advance an interest that the state deems compelling, balancing ... is unavoidable.
The court must inquire whether the state's interest is truly compelling, and, if so,
whether that interest justifies as much infringement on, and chilling of, protected
speech as the statute effects. 10 1
Courts have widely recognized that the state interest in fair and impartial courts is
compelling. 10 2 Because that compelling interest derives directly from the
99 See generally Richard Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth: Using Empirical Evidence to
Determine the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Laws Targeting Sham Issue Advocacy,
85 MINN. L. REv. 1773 (2001) (examining empirical evidence about ads in 2000 federal
elections to assess overbreadth claims about bright-line tests such as that adopted in BCRA).
100 FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986) (examining the
"essential nature" of a voter guide to determine whether it contained express advocacy).
101 Richard H. Fallon, Making Sense ofOverbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853,895 (1991).
102 See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 864 (8th Cir. 2001) ("There is
simply no question but that a judge's ability to apply the law neutrally is a compelling
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constitutional right to due process of law,103 which is not implicated in federal
elections, the interest should justify more infringement on speech than interests of
non-constitutional dimension.
Whether the Supreme Court will be willing to distinguish judicial elections
from other elections for campaign finance purposes remains to be seen. But
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White gives cause for some optimism. The five
justices in the White majority took pains to announce that "we neither assert nor
imply that the First Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office to sound
the same as those for legislative office." 104 If the "sound" of campaigns-the
actual content of candidate speech-may vary with the nature of the office
sought, surely such a distinction could be made when mere campaign finance
reporting requirements are imposed.
C. Contribution Limits
Judicial campaign finance laws need not vary from campaign finance law
generally when it comes to caps on contributions to candidates who choose not to
accept public funds. Such contribution limits are unquestionably constitutional
and already apply to judicial candidates in many states.' 05 Limiting the amount
that any one contributor may give to a candidate reduces the potential for
influence and may combat the public perception that money affects judicial
decisions. 106
governmental interest of the highest order."), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Republican
Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2535 (2002); Stretton v.
Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1991) ("'There can be no question... that a state
has a compelling interest in the integrity of its judiciary.").
103 See Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 617
(1993) ("[D]ue process requires a 'neutral and detached judge in the first instance ..... '.)
(quoting Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972)); Johnson v. Miss., 403
U.S. 212, 216 (1971) ('Trial before 'an unbiased judge' is essential to due process."); In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of
due process.").
104 122 S. Ct. at 2539.
105 Texas has contribution limits that apply exclusively to judicial candidates, including
aggregate limits on contributions from lawyers in a single law firm. See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN.
§§ 253.155-.157 (Vernon 2002).
106 Judicial candidates who opt out of a public financing program may also be restrained
from soliciting contributions directly from donors. In many states, codes of judicial conduct
require that candidates establish a committee to conduct fundraising for them. Whether these
committees successfully shield candidates from information about their contributors is a matter
of some doubt. To improve the chances that they will, states that bar direct solicitation should
ensure that disclosure laws allow the committee treasurer, rather than the candidate, to vouch
for the accuracy of campaign finance statements.
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For now, judicial candidates must be free to opt out of a public financing
system, but in doing so, they should not be free to collect contributions of
unlimited size. The Supreme Court has granted legislatures great discretion in
limiting the amount of contributions to candidates. Under Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC, contribution limits may not be found
unconstitutionally low unless they are "so radical in effect as to render political
association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate's voice below the level of
notice, and render contributions pointless."' 107 Since that decision, courts have
upheld limits as low as $100 per election.108 Low contributions limits would be
especially appropriate in the context of a public financing system for judicial
candidates, provided that they meet the Nixon test.
In Texas, aggregate limits are also in effect with respect to contributions from
members of a single law firm.109 The purpose of such a rule is to prevent firms
with litigation before an elected court from expressing the extent of their interest
in the electoral outcome through the value of numerous individual contributions
delivered to the judges in a collectively substantial bundle. By reducing the
amount of money coming from firms appearing before the court, the state hopes
to rebuild confidence in the impartiality of judicial decision-making.
But the limit favors candidates supported by large corporate defendants over
those preferred by individual plaintiffs because the law firms for both sides are
treated equally, but the clients are situated very differently. Large corporations
(and many of their executive personnel) can afford the maximum judicial
campaign contribution whereas most of the people suing them cannot. The
imbalance created by the contribution limit may exacerbate the perception that
courts are biased toward the wealthy."10
That perception may be addressed in part if corporate contributions are
banned, and contributions from executive or administrative corporate personnel
are treated in the same way as those from lawyers in a single firm, rather than as
107 528 U.S. 377,397 (2000).
108 See Frank v. Akron, 290 F.3d 813, 818 (6th Cir. 2002) (upholding a $100 limit for
contributions to candidates for local city council). Limits of $100 have also been upheld for
state elections in Montana. See Mont. Right to Life Ass'n v. Eddleman, No. CV 96-165-BLG-
JDS, slip op. (D. Mont. Sept. 19, 2000) (on file with the author). The size of limits should be
tailored to the jurisdiction in which candidates are running, so $100 limits are not necessarily
appropriate foijudicial elections.
109 See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 253.157 (Vernon 2002).
110 In a recent nationwide poll, 62% of voters agreed that "there are two systems ofjustice
in the U.S.-one for the rich and powerful and one for everyone else." See 2002 National
Polls, supra note 11. Any campaign finance law that systematically distinguishes between
lawyers and other contributors is likely to suffer from the same problem.
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contributions to a corporate PAC.III Although contributions from PACs may be
limited to the same amount as contributions from individuals, the contributors to
PACs-unlike the lawyers in Texas law firms -are typically not limited in the
aggregate with respect to what they may give as individuals to a campaign. The
law firm model for contributions from corporate management should therefore
help to preserve the appearance of impartiality in cases with economically
mismatched parties better than would a traditional PAC model.
Contributions from ordinary PACs and from political parties may, and
should, also be limited. 12 Such limits prevent individuals from evading the basic
contribution limits by funneling money through these organizations.
Contributions to these organizations may be limited on the same grounds. 13 The
constitutionality of such limits is well established.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, when campaigns for the bench become expensive and competitive,
states should provide public funds for judicial elections. But the full range of
public financing options appropriate for officials of the political branches do not
necessarily make sense for the judiciary. To preserve fair and impartial courts, the
ideal system would be a mandatory program of limited but generous lump sum
grants, with publicly funded voter guides and measures to address massive
interest group spending. If such a system is to be upheld against constitutional
challenge, however, courts (especially the federal courts, where most of the
litigation is filed) must recognize the crucial differences between elected judges
and other elected officers. The failure to make that distinction in campaign
finance jurisprudence will erode constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial
in much of the nation.
III Contributions from corporate treasuries have been banned under federal law since
1907. FECA also bans such contributions, as well as corporate expenditures for electioneering
but permits corporations to establish separate segregated funds for contributions solicited from
stockholders and executive or administrative personnel (and their families). See 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(a), (b)(4)(A)(i) (2002). Courts have upheld the bans on corporate contributions and
expenditures where provision has been made for creation of these funds, which function
essentially like PACs. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990)
(upholding state expenditure ban); Mariani v. United States, 212 F.3d 761, 765-66 (3d Cir.
2000) (upholding federal contribution ban); Kennedy v. Gardner, No. CV 98-608M, 1999 WL
814273, at *2-4 (D.N.H. Sept. 30, 1999) (invalidating New Hampshire contribution ban, which
did not provide for separate segregated funds); see generally WRITING REFORM, supra note 91,
at 11-29 through 111-33 (discussing contribution limits applicable to corporations and unions).
112 See WRrING REFORM, supra note 91, at 111-17 through 111-23.
113 See id. at IV- I through IV-4, IV-7 through IV-12.
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